Operation Northwoods - Memo

The following ideas were presented to the Secretary of Defense in the Operation Northwoods memo:

1. The Operation Northwoods plan included incidents to establish a credible threat from Cuba:

• Start rumors (many), use clandestine radio.
• Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over the fence" to stage attack on base.
• Capture Cubans (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
• Start riots near the base's main gate (friendly Cubans).
• Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
• Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
• Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base; some damage to installations.
• Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guatanamo City.
• Capture militia group which storms the base.
• Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.
• Sink ship near harbor entrance, conduct funerals for mock victims.

2. The U.S. would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, and destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base, and commence large scale military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

• We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guatanamo and blame Cuba.
• We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in Cuban waters. The U.S. could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by U.S. fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the nonexistent crew. Casualty lists in U.S. newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities, and even in Washington. The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United Sates even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, arrest the Cuban agents, and release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation. We know that Castro is backing suversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present, and possibly others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by U.S. pilots could provide additional provocation. Harrassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of U.S. military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback of this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from U.S. resources in about three months.

7. Hijacking attempts against civil and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama, or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holidy or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

• An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time, the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be laded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.
• Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft willb e scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. Fromt he rendezvous point, the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly to an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircract meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba, the drone will being transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by a radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the U.S. what has happened instead of the U.S. trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.