NORAD background
From Debunk911myths
Contents |
NORAD
Background
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was established in 1958 through a bilateral U.S.-Canada agreement. Its mission was, and is, to defend the airspace of North America and protect the continent. That mission does not distinguish between internal and external threats; but because NORAD was created to counter the Soviet threat, it came to define its job as defending against external attacks.
Soviet threat
The threat of Soviet bombers diminished significantly as the Cold War ended, and the number of NORAD alert sites was reduced from its Cold War high of 26. Some within the Pentagon argued in the 1990s that the alert sites should be eliminated entirely. In an effort to preserve their mission, members of the air defense community advocated the importance of air sovereignty against emerging "asymmetric threats" to the United States: drug smuggling, "non-state and state-sponsored terrorists," and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology.
NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles. Other threats were identified during the late 1990s, including terrorists' use of aircraft as weapons. Exercises were conducted to counter this threat, but they were not based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the use of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense). Exercise planners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States-and using them as guided missiles-was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11.
Notwithstanding the identification of these emerging threats, by 9/11 there were only seven alert sites left in the United States, each with two fighter aircraft on alert. This led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORAD was not postured adequately to protect the United States.
NORAD's mission
NORAD's mission was, and is, to defend the airspace of North America and protect the continent. That mission does not distinguish between internal and external threats; but because NORAD was created to counter the Soviet threat, it came to define its job as defending against external attacks. General Eberhart, the head of NORAD, explained in July 2001 that "missile warning continues to be “Job 1”" for NORAD, and that the "traditional NORAD mission of aerospace control, or more specifically airspace sovereignty, remains a fundamental priority."[1]
In a March 2002 statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Eberhart explained about how NORAD was setup prior to 9/11:[2]
| “ | Prior to 11 September 2001, our air defense posture was aligned to counter the perceived external threats to North America air sovereignty—-we considered flights originating domestically as “friendly by origin.” Within this context, our aerospace warning and control missions were oriented to detect and identify all air traffic entering North American airspace, and if necessary, intercept potentially threatening inbound aircraft. | ” |
NORAD structure
NORAD is based out of Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station and Peterson Air Force Base near Colorado Springs.
In the United States, NORAD is divided into three sectors:
- Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) - Rome, New York
- Southeast Air Defense Sector - Tyndall Air Force Base (Florida)
- Western Air Defense Sector - McChord Air Force Base (Washington State)
On the morning of 9/11, NEADS could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters:
- Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod, Massachusetts
- Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia.
Other facilities, not on "alert," would need time to arm the fighters and organize crews.
NEADS reported to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, which in turn reported to NORAD headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado.
FAA and NORAD
On 9/11, air defense of the United States relied on close cooperation between the NORAD and the FAA.
Previous hijackings
The most recent hijacking that involved U.S. air traffic controllers, FAA management, and military coordination had occurred in 1993.
Hijacking response protocols
The FAA and NORAD had developed protocols for working together in the event of a hijacking. As they existed on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government.
FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller via radio or by "squawking" a transponder code of "7500"-the universal code for a hijack in progress. Controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters in Washington. Headquarters had a hijack coordinator, who was the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate.
If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on duty to contact the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD's chain of command.
The NMCC would keep the FAA hijack coordinator up to date and help the FAA centers coordinate directly with the military. NORAD would receive tracking information for the hijacked aircraft either from joint use radar or from the relevant FAA air traffic control facility. Every attempt would be made to have the hijacked aircraft squawk 7500 to help NORAD track it.
The protocols did not contemplate an intercept. They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet, "vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft," where it could perform its mission to monitor the aircraft's flight path.
In sum, the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that
- The hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;
- There would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and
- Hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.
References
- ↑ General Eberhart's Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Strategic Subcommittee. NORAD (July 11, 2001). Archived from the original on August 3, 2002.
- ↑ Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF Commander in Chief, NORAD. Senate Armed Services Committee (March 20, 2002).