The fire detection and alarm systems, sprinklers, fire pumps and standpipe systems, emergency communication systems, smoke control and ventilation systems, and emergency power and lighting systems were all seriously damaged or destroyed upon impact of the planes, thus inhibiting emergency response operations.[1]
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Firefighters from the New York City Fire Department rushed to the World Trade Center minutes after the first plane struck the north tower. Chief Joseph Pfiefer and his crew with Battalion 1 among the first on the scene.[2] At 8:50 a.m., an incident command post was established in the lobby of the North Tower. By 9:00 a.m., the FDNY chief had arrived and took over command of the response operations. Due to falling debris and safety concerns, he moved the incident command center to a spot located across West Street, but numerous fire chiefs remained in the lobby which continued to serve as an operations post where alarms, elevators, communications systems, and other equipment were operated. The initial response by the FDNY was on rescue and evacuation of building occupants, which involved sending firefighters up to assist people that were trapped in elevators and elsewhere. Firefighters also were required to ensure all floors were completely evacuated.[3]
Numerous staging areas were setup near the World Trade Center, where responding fire units could report and get deployment instructions. However, many firefighters arrived at the World Trade Center without stopping at the staging areas. As a result, many chiefs could not keep track of the whereabouts of their units. Numerous firefighters reported directly to the building lobbies, and were ordered by those commanding the operating post to proceed into the building.[3]
Problems with radio communication caused commanders to lose contact with many of the firefighters who went into the buildings. The repeater system in the World Trade Center, which was required for portable radio signals to transmit reliably, was malfunctioning after the impact of the planes.[3] As a result, firefighters were unable report to commanders on their progress, and were unable to hear evacuation orders. Also, many off-duty firefighters arrived to help, without their radios.[4] FDNY commanders lacked communication with the NYPD, who had helicopters at the scene, or with EMS dispatchers. The firefighters on the scene also did not have access to television reports or other outside information, which could help in assessing the situation. When the South Tower collapsed at 9:59 a.m., firefighters in the North Tower were not aware of exactly what had happened. The battalion chief in the North Tower lobby immediately issued an order over the radio for firefighters in the tower to evacuate, but many did not hear the order.[3]
The command post located across West Street was taken out when the South Tower collapsed, making command and control even more difficult and disorganized. When the North Tower collapsed, falling debris killed Peter Ganci, the FDNY chief.[3] Following the collapse of the World Trade Center, a command post was set-up at a firehouse in Greenwich Village.
The FDNY deployed 200 units (half of all units) to the site, with more than 400 firefighters on the scene when the buildings collapsed.[5] This included 121 engine companies, 62 ladder companies, and other special units.[6] The FDNY also received assistance from fire departments in Nassau, Westchester County, and other neighboring jurisdictions, but with limited ability to manage and coordinate efforts.[3]
EMTs began arriving at 8:53 a.m., and quickly set-up a staging area outside the North Tower, at West Street, which was quickly moved over to the corner of Vesey and West Streets. As more EMTs responded to the scene, five triage areas were set-up around the World Trade Center site. EMS chiefs experienced difficulties communicating via their radios, due to the overwhelming volume of radio traffic. At 9:45, an additional dispatch channel was set aside for use by chiefs and supervisors only, but many did not know about this and continued to operate on the other channel. The communication difficulties meant that commanders lacked good situational awareness. [7]
Dispatchers at the 9-1-1 call center, who coordinate EMS response and assign units, were overwhelmed incoming calls, as well as communications over the radio system. Dispatchers were unable to process and make sense of all the incoming information, including information from people trapped in the towers, about conditions on the upper floors. Overwhelmed dispatchers were unable to effectively give instructions and manage the situation.[7]
EMS personnel were in disarray after the collapse of the South Tower at 9:59 a.m. Following the collapse of the North Tower at 10:29 a.m., EMS commanders regrouped on the North End of Battery Park City, at the Embassy Suites Hotel. Around 11:00 a.m., EMS triage centers were relocated and consolidated at the Chelsea Piers and the Staten Island Ferry Terminal.[7] Throughout the early afternoon, the soundstages at the Pier were separated into two areas, one for the more seriously injured and one for the walking wounded. On the acute side, multiple makeshift tables, each with a physician, nurse, and other healthcare and civilian volunteers, were set up for the arrival of mass casualties.
Supplies, including equipment for airway and vascular control, were obtained from neighboring hospitals. Throughout the afternoon, local merchants arrived to generously donate food. Despite this, few patients arrived for treatment, the earliest at about 5 p.m., and were not seriously injured, being limited to smoke inhalation. An announcement was made around 6-7 p.m. that a second shift of providers would cover the evening shift, and that an area was being set-up for the day personnel to sleep. Soon after, when it was realized that few would have survived the collapse and be brought to the Piers, many decided to leave and area was closed down.
The New York City Police Department quickly responded with numerous Emergency Service Units (ESU) and other responders after the crash of Flight 11 into the North Tower.[8] NYPD helicopters were soon at the scene, reporting on the status of the burning buildings. When the buildings collapsed, 23 NYPD officers were killed, along with numerous Port Authority police officers. The police department helped facilitate the evacuation of civilians out of Lower Manhattan, including approximately 5,000 civilians evacuated by the Harbor Unit to Staten Island and to New Jersey.[8] In ensuing days, the NYPD worked alternating 12-hour shifts to help in the rescue and recovery efforts.[9]
After the 1993 bombing, New York City's public safety agencies realized the problems they had coordinating with each other. Yet, the rift between the Fire Department and NYPD widened in 1996 after the FDNY took over the EMS. The FDNY took away radios they had that provided communications with the police. Also, when new radios were purchased in 1997/98, they went unused.[10]