8:09 a.m. - American Airlines Flight 77 pushed back from Gate D-26 at Dulles International Airport.
8:20 a.m. - Flight 77 took off from Dulles.
8:40 a.m. - Washington Air Traffic Control Center handed off Flight 77 to the Indianapolis Center. Up to that point, the flight was proceeding as normal.
8:46 a.m. - Flight 77 reached cruising altitude at 35,000 ft. At this point, cabin service would begin.
8:51 a.m. - Flight 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication, an acknowledgment from the cockpit crew to air traffic control's navigational instructions.
8:52 a.m. - Some point between 8:51 and 8:54 a.m., the hijackers began their assault, using knives and box cutters as reported by a passenger. All the passengers were moved to the rear of the aircraft.
8:54 a.m. - The aircraft began deviating from its assigned course, making a turn towards the south.
8:56 a.m. - The transponder was turned off. The controller tracking Flight 77 lost site of it, but continued to search for it. Over the next six and half minutes, the Indianapolis Center made ten unsuccessful attempts to contact the aircraft. At this point, the controller believed the aircraft experienced mechanical problems.
8:58 a.m. - FAA air traffic control contacted American Airlines to inform them that contact with Flight 77 was last. Over the next three minutes, American Airlines made several attempts to contact the aircraft.
9:00 a.m. - American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learned that communication had been lost with Flight 77. He ordered all American Airlines flights in the Northeast that had not taken off to remain grounded.
9:00 a.m. - Flight 77 turned east and shortly thereafter began to descend.
9:02 a.m. - FAA air traffic controllers told American Airlines that they did not know where Flight 77 was, and were unable to contact it. Three minutes later, American Airlines began lockout procedures to protect information about the flight.
9:05 a.m. - Flight 77 re-emerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes, well east of its last known position. However, the aircraft was not detected by controllers because they were searching along its projected flight path to the west and southwest.
9:07 a.m. - Flight 77 leveled off at 25,000 ft and made a slight course change to the east-northeast.
9:08 a.m. - American Airlines officials concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77.
9:08 a.m. - The Indianapolis Center contacted Air Force Search and Rescue in Langley, Virginia to request that they be on the lookout for an accident involving Flight 77 because of the simultaneous loss of radio communications and all radar contact.
9:09 a.m. - Indianapolis Center called the FAA Great Lakes Regional Office to notify about a possible accident involving Flight 77.
9:10 a.m. - Some time between 9:00 and 9:10 a.m., an American Airlines air traffic control specialist at SOC who was in communication with the Herndon Command Center notified SOC air traffic control manager that he learned United was "missing a plane." American Airlines headquarters extended its ground stop nationwide.
9:11 a.m. - Renee May, a flight attendant, attempted to call her parents but the call did not connect. A second call at 9:12 a.m. did go through. May told her mother that the flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them -- her mother was not sure if Renee meant all the passengers or just the crew -- to the rear of the plane. May asked her mother to contact American Airlines and make sure they knew about the hijacking, giving three phone numbers in Northern Virginia to call. Renee May's parents subsequently (sometime between 9:12 a.m. and the time of the crash) reached an American Airlines employee at Reagan National Airport, providing information about the hijacking, along with Renee's phone number on board and the flight number. Initially, the employee thought May's mother was talking about the aircraft that had crashed into the World Trade Center. May's mother reiterated that she was speaking of Flight 77, which was still in the air. At some point after completing the call, the employee was told to evacuate the building. On her way out, she heard explosions from the direction of the Pentagon, though she was not sure that it was the crash of an aircraft. She informed a flight services manager at the airport about her conversation with May's parents.
9:15 a.m. - Around 9:15 a.m., after confirming that two airliners had struck the World Trade Center, American ordered all of its airborne flights to land.
9:16 a.m. - An American Airlines air traffic control specialist phoned an official at the Herndon Command Center to inquire about the status of New York City air traffic. Over the course of this conversation, which lasted two and half minutes, the specialist said that American Airlines "thought" Flight 11 had crashed into the World Trade Center. Flight 77, he said, was "missing." As he made his report, he received an update from American's SOC indicating that Flight 77 also might have crashed into the towers. He updated the ATC official but wondered how Flight 77 could have gotten to New York City. The ATC official replied that the second crash might not have been Flight 77 because "we [ATC] have another call sign" for that incident. At that point, though, the Herndon Command Center was not sure of the identity of either two crashed aircraft and provided no further information.
9:16 a.m. - At some point between 9:16 and 9:26 a.m., Barbara Olson, a Flight 77 passenger, called her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. Olson spoke to his wife for about one minute before the call was cut off. She reported that the flight had been hijacked and the hijackers were wielding knives and box cutters. She did not mention stabbing or slashing of the crew or passengers. The hijackers, she said, were not aware of her phone call. All of the passengers were in the back of the plane. Barbara Olson had been seated in first class. After this call, Ted Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft. He contacted the Department of Justice Command Center and requested that they send someone to his office. He also told the Department of Justic Command Center that his wife's flight had been hijacked and gave them the flight number.
9:18 a.m. - By no later than 9:18 a.m., FAA centers in Indianapolis, Cleveland, and Washington were aware that Flight 77 was missing and that two aircraft had struck the World Trade Center.
9:20 a.m. - By 9:20 a.m., Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft in the system, and began to doubt its initial assumption that Flight 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern began between the manager at Indianapolis and the Herndon Command Center prompted the Command Center to notify some FAA field facilities that Flight 77 was lost.
9:20 a.m. - Between 9:20 and 9:31 a.m., Barbara Olson again called her husband. During their second conversation, she reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked and she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do. Ted Olson asked for her location. She said that the aircraft was flying over houses. Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast. Ted Olson informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes, but she did not display signs of panic or indicate any awareness of an impending crash. The call abruptly ended.
9:21 a.m. - By 9:21 a.m., the Herndon Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for Flight 77. They feared it had been hijacked.
9:21 a.m. - Herndon Command Center advised a supervisor at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility that the FAA had lost contact with Flight 77 and was trying to find the aircraft. Controllers at Dulles TRACON were advised that a commercial aircraft was missing and instructed to look for primary targets.
9:24 a.m. - The FAA's Great Lakes Regional Office notified the agency's headquarters in Washington, D.C. that Flight 77 might have been involved in an accident.
9:25 a.m. - Herndon Command Center advised FAA headquarters that Flight 77 was lost in Indianapolis Center's airspace. It could not be located on radar.
9:25 a.m. - Ben Sliney, the Herndon Command Center National Operations Manager, ordered a "nationwide ground stop," which prevented any aircraft from taking off in the United States.
9:29 a.m. - Flight 77 was now flying at 7,000 feet and was approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon.
9:32 a.m. - At or shortly after 9:32 a.m., controllers at Dulles TRACON "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed," and notified Reagan National Airport of the approaching aircraft. This was later determined to have been Flight 77.
9:34 a.m. - Flight 77 was 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon. It began a 330-degree right turn. At the end of the turn, the plane descended through 2,200 feet pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington D.C.
9:34 a.m. - NEADS Identification Technicians who, at 9:21 a.m., had been told by Boston Center that Filght 11 was still airborne and heading south, contacted the Operations Manager at Washington Center to provide an update on the evolving situation. In the course of this conversation, the Operations Manager informed NEADS that Flight 77 was lost. He did not inform NEADS that it was hijacked because he did not know. This discussion was the first notice to the military that Flight 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that cal to Washington Center, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that Flight 77 was even missing.
9:34 a.m. - An update by the American Airlines SOC indicated that Flights 11 and 77 had been the aircraft that crashed into the World Trade Center.
9:36 a.m. - Reagan Airport controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C-130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en-route to Minnesota, to identify and follow the primary target identified by Dulles TRACON. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identifeid it as a Boeing 757, and attempted to follow its path.
9:36 a.m. - The FAA's Boston Center, which had learned of the unidentified primary radar target tracking eastbound via an FAA conference call line, called NEADS and relayed the report of the aircraft closing in on Washingtn. The aircraft that still had not been linked with the missing Flight 77. Boston Center told NEADS, "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [Visual Flight Rules] six miles southeast of the White Houes... Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling new prompted the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS to order "AFIO" (Authorization for Intercepter Operations), which entailed taking immediate conrol of the Langley fighters from the FAA. He then ordered the fighters to proceed directly towards Washington DC, "Okay, we're going to turn it... crank it up... Run them to the White House."
9:36 a.m. - Shortly after 9:36 a.m., the Mission Crew Commander at NEADS discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north as the scramble order had instructed, but east over the ocen. His response was emotional, "I don't care how many windows you break," he said, "Damn it... Okay. Push them back."
9:37:46 a.m. - American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. THe aircraft was traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour on impact. All on board were killed, along with 125 civilian and military personnel in the Pentagon. The Langley fighters were approximately 150 miles away.
At 7:15, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter.
Within the next 20 minutes, they would be followed by Hani Hanjour and two brothers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi.
Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were flagged by CAPPS.
The Hazmi brothers were also selected for extra scrutiny by the air-line's customer service representative at the check-in counter. He did so because one of the brothers did not have photo identification nor could he understand English, and because the agent found both of the passengers to be suspicious.
The only consequence of their selection was that their checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had boarded the aircraft.
Security checkpoint
All five hijackers passed through the Main Terminal's west security screening checkpoint.
United Airlines, which was the responsible air carrier, had contracted out the work to Argenbright Security. The checkpoint featured closed-circuit television that recorded all passengers, including the hijackers, as they were screened.
At 7:18, Mihdhar and Moqed entered the security checkpoint. Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the belt of the X-ray machine and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both set off the alarm, and they were directed to a second metal detector. Mihdhar did not trigger the alarm and was permitted through the checkpoint. After Moqed set it off, a screener wanded him. He passed this inspection.
About 20 minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, Hani Han-jour, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt in the Main Terminal's west checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm, through the metal detector.
A short time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi cleared the metal detector and was permitted through; Nawaf al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his over-the-shoulder carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed. The video footage indicates that he was carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket, clipped to its rim.
When the local civil aviation security office of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) later investigated these security screening operations, the screeners recalled nothing out of the ordinary. They could not recall that any of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees. We asked a screening expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he found the quality of the screener's work to have been "marginal at best." The screener should have "resolved" what set off the alarm; and in the case of both Moqed and Hazmi, it was clear that he did not.
Boarded aircraft
At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and were seated in 12A and 12B in coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat 1B (first class), soon followed.The Hazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the first-class cabin.
Departure
American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dulles for Los Angeles at 8:10.
The aircraft was a Boeing 757 piloted by Captain Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois.
There were four flight attendants, and 58 passengers aboard.
American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at 8:20.
At 8:46, the flight reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin service would have begun.
Hijacking
At 8:51, American 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication.
The hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54.
As on American 11 and United 175, the hijackers used knives (reported by one passenger) and moved all the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (reported by one flight attendant and one passenger).
Unlike the earlier flights, the Flight 77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have box cutters.
Finally, a passenger reported that an announcement had been made by the "pilot" that the plane had been hijacked. Neither of the firsthand accounts mentioned any stabbings or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace, though both witnesses began the flight in the first-class cabin.
At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south. Two minutes later the transponder was turned off and even primary radar contact with the aircraft was lost. The Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center repeatedly tried and failed to contact the aircraft. American Airlines dispatchers also tried, without success.
At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learned that communications had been lost with American 77.This was now the second American aircraft in trouble. He ordered all American Airlines flights in the Northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground. Shortly before 9:10, suspecting that American 77 had been hijacked, American headquarters concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have been Flight 77. After learning that United Airlines was missing a plane, American Airlines headquarters extended the ground stop nationwide.