American Airlines Flight 77

American Airlines Flight 77, the third flight hijacked on 9/11, was crashed into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.

Hijackers

The hijackers on American Airlines Flight 77 included Hani Hanjour, who piloted the aircraft into the Pentagon, along with four muscle hijackers: Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem al-Hazmi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed. Hanjour came to the United States in 1996 for flight training, which he took at the CRM Airline Training Center in Scottsdale, Arizona. After on and off periods of training, Hanjour earned his commercial pilot's certificate from the FAA in April 1999. He had wanted to be a commercial pilot for Saudi Arabian Airlines, but was rejected when he applied to the civil aviation school in Jeddah in 1999. Frustrated at not finding a job, his friends said that Hanjour "spent hours online at a family-owned Internet cafe. He read voraciously about piloting, and increasingly turned his attention toward religious texts and cassette tapes of militant Islamic preachers."^[1] Hanjour left Saudi Arabia in late 1999, telling his family that he was going to the United Arab Emirates to work for an airline. Hanjour instead ended up in Afghanistan where Al Qaeda recruits are screened for special skills they may have. Already having selected the Hamburg Cell members, Al Qaeda leaders selected Hanjour to lead the fourth team of hijackers.^[2]

In December 2000, Hanjour arrived in San Diego, joining "muscle" hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, who had been there since November 1999.^[3] Soon after arriving, Hanjour and al-Hazmi left for Mesa, Arizona, where Hanjour began refresher training at Arizona Aviation. In the spring of 2001, they headed east, ending up in Falls Church, Virginia. There, they awaited Majed Moqed who arrived on May 2, 2001 with Flight 175 hijacker Ahmed al-Ghamdi at Dulles International Airport. Moqed moved into an apartment with al-Hazmi and Hanjour.^[4] On May 21, 2001, Hanjour rented a room in Paterson, New Jersey, where the hijackers stayed through the end of August.^[5] Salem al-Hazmi arrived on June 29, 2001 with Flight 11 hijacker Abdulaziz al-Omari at John F. Kennedy International Airport and stayed with Hanjour.^[4] Hani Hanjour received further ground instruction and did practice flights at Air Fleet Training Systems in Teterboro, New Jersey, and at Caldwell Flight Academy in Fairfield, New Jersey.^[6] Hanjour moved out of the room in Paterson and arrived at the Valencia Motel in Laurel, Maryland on September 2, 2001.^[5] While in Maryland, Hanjour and fellow hijackers trained at the Gold's Gym in Greenbelt.^[7] On September 10, he completed a certification flight, using a terrain recognition system for navigation, at Congressional Air Charters in Gaithersburg, Maryland.^[8][9] At 3 p.m. on September 10, Nawaf al-Hazmi, accompanied by other hijackers, checked into the Marriott in Herndon, Virginia.^[10]

The flight

At 07:15, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Majed Moqed checked-in at the American Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77,^[11] and they arrived at the passenger security checkpoint a few minutes later.^[12] Both men set off the metal detector and were put through secondary screening. Moqed continued to set off the alarm, so he was searched with a hand wand.^[13] The Hazmi brothers checked in together at the ticket counter at 07:29. Hani Hanjour checked in separately, and arrived at the passenger security checkpoint at 07:35.^[9] Hanjour was followed minutes later at the checkpoint by Salem and Nawaf Hazmi, the latter who set off the metal detector's alarm. The screener never "resolved" what set off the alarm. Nawaf Hazmi had an unidentified item in his back pocket, but four-inch utility knives were nonetheless permitted by the FAA as carry-on items. So, he would likely be permitted to proceed, even if the item was identified.^[13]

The hijackers were also all selected for extra screening of their checked bags. Hani Hanjour, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were chosen by the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System criteria, while Nawaf al-Hazmi and Salem al-Hazmi were selected because they did not provide adequate identification and deemed suspicious by the airline check-in agent.^[12] Hanjour, al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi did not check any bags for the flight. Checked bags belonging to Moqed and Salem al-Hazmi were held until they boarded the aircraft.^[14] By 07:50 Eastern Time, the five hijackers, carrying knives and box cutters, had made it through the airport security checkpoint and boarded Flight 77 to Los Angeles.^[11] On the flight, Hani Hanjour was seated up front in 1B, while Salem and Nawaf al-Hazmi were seated further back in first class in 5E and 5F. Majed Moqed and Khalid al-Mihdhar were seated further back in 12A and 12B.^[15] The flight was scheduled to depart at 08:10, but actually departed 10 minutes late from Gate D26 at Dulles.^[16][17]

Captain Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois were at control of the plane, which had 58 passengers (including the hijackers). In addition to the captain and first officer, the flight crew included four flight attendants: Michele Heidenberger, Jennifer G. Lewis, Kenneth E. Lewis, and Renee May. The aircraft was a Boeing 757-223 -- registration number N644AA. The capacity of the aircraft was 176 passengers, but with 58 passengers on September 11, the load factor was 33 percent. Tuesdays were the least traveled day of the week, with the same level of load factor seen on Tuesdays in the previous three-months for Flight 77. American Airlines Flight 77 took off from Washington Dulles International Airport at 8:20 a.m., with Los Angeles International Airport the intended destination.^[14]

The flight proceeded normally, reaching cruising altitude of 35,000 ft at 8:46 a.m., which is the point when cabin service would begin.^[14]

Hijacking

The last routine radio communication from the flight was transmitted at 8:51 a.m. The hijackers on the flight were Hani Hanjour (pilot), along with Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem al-Hazmi, Majed Moqed, and Khalid al-Mihdhar. At 8:54 a.m., the aircraft began to deviate from course and turn back towards Washington, D.C. Phone calls were made from the plane, using airphones, by Renee May and by Barbara Olson.

The transponder on the aircraft was turned off after it was hijacked, making it difficult for air traffic controllers to locate it once it turned around. At 9:21 a.m., the Herndon Control Center (of the FAA) knew that Flight 77 was missing and asked the Dulles terminal control facility to look for primary targets on the radar. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed" and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service.

At 9:34 a.m., NEADS (Northeast Air Defense Sector) contacted the FAA's Washington Center, regarding American Airlines Flight 11 (already crashed, but they thought it was still airborne). In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: "We're looking-we also lost American 77." This was the first notice to the military that American Airlines Flight 77 was missing, giving them 3-4 minutes to respond.

Phone calls

Renee May's phone call

At 9:12, Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She said her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them to the rear of the plane. She asked her mother to alert American Airlines. Nancy May and her husband promptly did so.

Barbara Olson's phone call

At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. She reported that the flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and box cutters. She further indicated that the hijackers were not aware of her phone call, and that they had put all the passengers in the back of the plane. About a minute into the conversation, the call was cut off. Solicitor General Olson tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft.

Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband again. She reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, and she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do. Ted Olson asked for her location and she replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses. Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast. The Solicitor General then informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes. She did not display signs of panic and did not indicate any awareness of an impending crash. At that point, the second call was cut off.

• At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft was at 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon.
• At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed." This was later determined to have been Flight 77.
• At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House. American 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began a 330-degree turn. At the end of the turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington. The hijacker pilot then advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the Pentagon.
• At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour.61 All on board, as well as many civilian and military personnel in the building, were killed.

Crash

At 9:37:44 a.m., Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. American Airlines Flight 77 came in from the west, then looped around to the south, through Alexandria, and then up Columbia Pike, coming alongside I-395, crossed over Washington Boulevard, and crashing into the southwest side of the Pentagon at 9:37:44 a.m. Numerous witnesses, including motorists on I-395, Washington Boulevard, and areas around the Pentagon saw the plane crash.

The section of the Pentagon that was hit had recently been renovated at a cost of $250 million.^[18] At the time of the attacks, approximately 18,000 people worked in the Pentagon, which was 4,000 less than before renovations began in 1998.^[19] The part of the building hit housed the Naval Command Center and other Pentagon offices, as well as some unoccupied offices.^[20]

FAA and NORAD response

NEADS was informed about American Airlines Flight 77 at 9:34 a.m., four minutes before it crashed into the Pentagon.

American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8:54, with a slight turn toward the south. Two minutes later, it disappeared completely from radar at Indianapolis Center, which was controlling the flight.

The controller tracking American 77 told us he noticed the aircraft turning to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear. The controller looked for primary radar returns. He searched along the plane's projected flight path and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn. No primary targets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the air-line. Again there was nothing. At this point, the Indianapolis controller had no knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircraft had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious electrical or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone.

Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies that American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed. At 9:08, Indianapolis Center asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look for a downed aircraft. The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police and asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received. At 9:09, it reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9:24.

By 9:20, Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft, and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. A discussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Command Center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities that American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters of the situation.

The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.

According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center's airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's airspace at 9:10.As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight's projected path, not east-where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.

In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C.

By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England Region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said "we have some planes." Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount. A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a "nationwide ground stop." While this was being discussed by executives at FAA headquarters, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25.

The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed" and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service. The aircraft's identity or type was unknown.

Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard C130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to identify and follow the suspicious aircraft. The C-130H pilot spotted it, identified it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds after impact, reported to the control tower: "looks like that aircraft crashed into the Pentagon sir."

Military Notification and Response

NORAD heard nothing about the search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renewed reports about a plane that no longer existed: American 11.

At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA:

FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards-heading towards Washington.

NEADS: Okay. American 11 is still in the air?

FAA: Yes.

NEADS: On its way towards Washington?

FAA: That was another-it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That's the latest report we have.

NEADS: Okay.

FAA: I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.

NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn't the hijack at all then, right?

FAA: No, he is a hijack.

NEADS: He-American 11 is a hijack?

FAA: Yes.

NEADS: And he's heading into Washington?

FAA: Yes. This could be a third aircraft.

The mention of a "third aircraft" was not a reference to American 77.There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne. We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information.

The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the mission crew commander, who reported to the NEADS battle commander:

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: Okay, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he's heading towards Washington. Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.

After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued the order at 9:23:"Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washington area.. . . [I]f they're there then we'll run on them.. . .These guys are smart." That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:24. Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided to keep the Otis fighters over New York. The heading of the Langley fighters was adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area. The mission crew commander explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters between the reported southbound American 11 and the nation's capital.

At the suggestion of the Boston Center's military liaison, NEADS contacted the FAA's Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of the conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS: "We're looking-we also lost American 77."The time was 9:34. This was the first notice to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance. If NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would have received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, although the FAA had been searching for it. No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77.

At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington: "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters: "Okay, we're going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House." He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean. "I don't care how many windows you break," he said. "Damn it.. . . Okay. Push them back."

The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. First, unlike a normal scramble order, this order did not include a distance to the target or the target's location. Second, a "generic" flight plan-prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly-incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles. Third, the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go "090 for 60" superseded the original scramble order.

After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few miles from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D.C. Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but "it kind of faded" over Washington. The time was 9:38.The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46.The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away.

Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989.The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second.

NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93.

Flight Data Recorder

• Flight Data Recorder - report
• Air Traffic Control - report
• Flight Path Study
• Autopilot Study
• AA77 FDR Data Explained - post by Anti-sophist on JREF forums

See also

• American Airlines Flight 77 - Timeline
• Pentagon witnesses
• Pentagon security video

References

Further reading

• Flight77.info - Security camera videos and documents
• Sept. 11 panel criticizes Dulles security screeners, AP/MSNBC, July 22, 2004
• CNN transcript - September 14, 2001
• The FBI's Hijacker List, CBS News, September 27, 2001