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Al Qaeda financing

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Osama bin Laden's fortune has been said to be $250 million-$300 million, inherited from his father who owned a major construction company in Saudi Arabia.[1][2] While Bin Laden is not poor, this figure is likely by far over-estimating his wealth. From 1970 to 1994, bin Laden received $1 million a year, but was cut off in 1994 after a Saudi crackdown and his citizenship revoked.Information about Bin Laden finances came from visits to Saudi Arabia by the NSC in 1999 and 2000 after the East Africa embassy bombings. U.S. officials met with the Saudis on the issue of terrorist financing, and they interviewed members of Bin Laden's family in the United States.[3] Though, Bin Laden's sister-in-law, Carmen, thinks he may still be getting some support from the family.[4]

Bin Laden may have owned some businesses (possibly 35 companies) while he was in Sudan, from 1992 to 1996. His investments may have been to gain influence with the Sudan government, rather than as a revenue source for Al Qaeda. When he was forced to leave Sudan in 1996, the Sudanese government "apparently expropriated his assets and seized his accounts." When he left Sudan, Bin Laden also reportedly lost $150 million or more in investments.[5] Bin Laden had invested money to build a road in the Sudan, expecting the government to pay him, but Bin Laden only received $10 or 20 million.[6] When he left Sudan, Bin Laden had little money and it took months for him to get back on his feet when he arrived in Afghanistan in 1996. From that point on, Bin Laden turned to fundraising to support Al Qaeda.[7]

Funding sources

Al Qaeda was not funded by Bin Laden himself, through his personal fortune. He did not have access to any significant amounts of personal wealth (particularly after his move from Sudan to Afghanistan). Instead, al Qaeda was supported by fundraising from various Islamic charities in the Gulf region, as well as "financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors". During the Afghanistan War in the 1980s, funds came from Saudi Arabia to fundamentalist organizations in Pakistan to train and arm Afghans and Arab mujahadeen. Some of those who fought in Afghanistan returned to their home countries, launching attacks in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. Others trained at camps in Afghanistan and the Sudan.[8]

While the Saudi government officially discontinued funding in 1993 for fundamentalist charities, contributions continued to come from private individuals in Saudi Arabia. Grand Mufti Abdel Aziz bin Baz, the head of the Muassassat al-Dirasaat wal-Buhuth (once a semi-official and now independent agency for collecting "mufti" or religious tithe contributed by Muslims) distributed funds to the Islamic Relief Agency, which has channeled money to extremist organizations. The Islamic Relief Agency in the Philippines was once headed by Mohammed Jamal Khalifah, who helped finance Ramzi Yousef. Khalifah is a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden.[8]

At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda operated with $30 million per year, including $20 million that annually went to support the Taliban. Funds were also used for training camps in Afghanistan, to create terrorist networks and alliances, and support the jihadists and their families. A relatively small amount of money went to finance operations, including the 9/11 attacks.[9]

Possible sources

  • Some wealthy Saudi businessmen and some Middle East countries make protection payments to prevent terrorist attacks.[10]
  • An international network of Islamic charities provides millions of dollars, sometimes without the knowledge of charity officials, investigators say. In some cases, the charities are legitimate organizations that allegedly have one or more branches infiltrated by al-Qaeda members.[10]
  • Suspected front businesses, including three Middle East companies and an Italian religious center, have allegedly provided additional income and enabled al-Qaeda to move money, weapons and men worldwide.[10] The 9/11 Commission believes that this was not a major source of funding, if at all part of the funding mechanism.[11]
  • Criminal enterprises, ranging from petty theft to the international opium and heroin trade, also contribute.[10] The 9/11 Commission found no persuasive evidence that this was an important source of revenue at the time of the 9/11 attacks.[12]
  • Transfers from legitimate banks, including a Sudanese bank that investigators believe may be controlled by bin Laden, enable al-Qaeda to shift money to its operatives around the world. The organization uses members to smuggle cash across borders. Investigators believe it also uses hawala -- an informal, largely undocumented money transfer system common in the Middle East.[10]

9/11 attacks

Al Qaeda is estimated to have spent $400,000 - 500,000, including $300,000 that passed through the hijackers' bank accounts in the United States. Before the attacks, they returned approximately $26,000 to someone in the United Arab Emirates.[13] The hijackers were not particularly adept with using the international banking system, thus they left a paper trail behind that linked the hijackers together and to Al Qaeda.[14] They obtain money via wire transfers from overseas, bringing cash or travelers checks into the United States, or using debit and credit cards to access funds held in foreign banks.[15]

Flight training

The Hamburg operatives (Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah) paid for their flight training primarily with funds wired from Dubai by KSM's nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali. Between June 29 and September 17, 2000, Ali sent Shehhi and Atta a total of $114,500 in five transfers ranging from $5,000 to $70,000. Ali relied on the unremarkable nature of his transactions, which were essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing daily across the globe. Ali was not required to provide identification in sending this money and the aliases he used were not questioned.[16]

Organizations

After 9/11, a list of individuals, organizations and charities was issued, with sanctions against them.

Charities

  • Makhtab Al-Khidamat, affiliated with the Brooklyn-based Alkifah Refugee Center
  • Wafa Humanitarian Organization - Saudi charity
  • Al Rashid Trust - based in Pakistan

Organizations

  • Abu Sayyaf Group
  • Armed Islamic Group - Algerian group
  • Harakat ul-Mujahidin - Pakistan
  • Al-Jihad - Egypt
  • Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
  • Asbat al-Ansar - Lebanon
  • Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) - Algeria
  • Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
  • Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) - Ethiopia
  • Islamic Army of Aden - Yemen
  • Mamoun Darkazanli Import-Export - based in Germany

Saudi connections

Princess Haifa, wife of Saudi Prince Bandar, gave funds to a Saudi man in California who in turn provided assistance to hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi when they first arrived in the United States in January 2000. Princess Haifa, who had been living in Washington for more than twenty years, unlikely knew were the money ended up going.

The response from the Saudi Arabia embassy in Washington:

We do this in Saudi Arabia. We help our people, whether... we have a social welfare net that covers every one of our citizens.[17]

From a December 2002 Newsweek report:

About two months after al-Bayoumi began aiding Alhazmi and Almihdhar, NEWSWEEK has learned, al-Bayoumi's wife began receiving regular stipends, often monthly and usually around $2,000, totaling tens of thousands of dollars. The money came in the form of cashier's checks, purchased from Washington's Riggs Bank by Princess Haifa bint Faisal, the daughter of the late King Faisal and wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi envoy who is a prominent Washington figure and personal friend of the Bush family. The checks were sent to a woman named Majeda Ibrahin Dweikat, who in turn signed over many of them to al-Bayoumi's wife (and her friend), Manal Ahmed Bagader. The Feds want to know: Was this well-meaning charity gone awry? Or some elaborate money-laundering scheme? A scam? Or just a coincidence?

A spokesperson for Princess Haifa told NEWSWEEK that she had no idea the money was going to the al-Bayoumi family or that it might in any way be used for some nefarious purpose. Saudi officials and members of the royal family routinely give money to supplicants who need medical or financial help and write the embassy. Dwei-kat's husband, Osama Basnan, had first pleaded to the Saudi Embassy for help in 1998, saying that he needed money to treat his wife's thyroid condition. At the time, Prince Bandar wrote Basnan a $15,000 check. The monthly payments to his wife, Majeda, began in January 1999 and ended only last summer. Until she was contacted late last week by NEWSWEEK, Princess Haifa was unaware that the payments are being investigated by U.S. authorities, according to the spokesperson.[18]

Federal government response

Measures to deal with money laundering were largely focused on drug trafficking and large-scale financial fraud, and not the type of transactions made by the hijackers.[19]

  • Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) - Treasury Department
  • Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

Following the 1998 African embassy bombings, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order which prohibited financial transactions between U.S. companies and Bin Laden.[20]

In July 1999, under Executive Order 13129, assets belonging to the Taliban were frozen. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) has allowed the financial assets of other state sponsors of terrorism to be blocked, including Syria. The United States is able to get U.S. financial institutions to block those assets. The Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was put forth in January 2000, to require governments internationally to criminalize financial support for terrorist groups or activities, and freeze funds, as well as cooperate on investigations and extraditions for cases involving terrorism financing.[21]

There are limitations on what these strategies can do, with terrorist organizations and members using non-U.S. financial channels, as well as unofficial channels. They may also alter their names, making it difficult to trace the assets. As well, large amounts of funds are not needed to carry out terrorist activities.[22]

References

  1. "Osama bin Laden: Who and Why", USA Today (September 21, 2001). 
  2. Sennott, Charles M. (September 13, 2001). "Money, loathing fuel bin Laden's network", Boston Globe. 
  3. 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5, note 112; Rick Newcomb interview; William Wechsler interview
  4. "Bin Laden no longer seen as main al-Qaida financier", MSNBC (September 2, 2004). 
  5. Ambah, Faiza Saleh (August 30, 1998). "Saudi militant's wish: To die fighting America", Associated Press. 
  6. "Interview: Dr. Saad al-Fagih". Frontline: Hunitng Bin Laden. PBS. Retrieved on 2008-09-17.
  7. "Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph". 9/11 Commission (2004).
  8. 8.0 8.1 Lief, Louise; Brian Duffy; Richard Z. Chesnoff (November 27, 1995). "Telling friend from foe", U.S. News & World Report. 
  9. "Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph". 9/11 Commission (2004).
  10. 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 McCoy, Kevin and Dennis Cauchon (October 16, 2001). "The business side of terror", USA Today. 
  11. "Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph". 9/11 Commission (2004).
  12. "Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph". 9/11 Commission (2004).
  13. "Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph". 9/11 Commission (2004).
  14. "Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph". 9/11 Commission (2004).
  15. "Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph". 9/11 Commission (2004).
  16. 9-11 Commission Report, Chapter 7
  17. "Troubled Connection", NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, PBS (November 26, 2002). 
  18. Iskioff, Michael and Evan Thomas (2002-12-02). "The Saudi Money Trail", Newsweek. 
  19. "Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph". 9/11 Commission (2004).
  20. "Bin Laden's Money", All Things Considered, NPR (August 22, 1998). 
  21. Pillar, Paul R. (2003). Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Brookings Institution, pp. 93-94. 
  22. Pillar, Paul R. (2003). Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Brookings Institution, pp. 94-95. 

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