Al Qaeda ("the base" in Arabic) was established by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s, while he was in Afghanistan.
Though, bin Laden and his associates never publicly used this term, Al Qaeda, until after 9/11, the name is referenced in Al Qaeda documents dating back to 1988.[1][2] At the Farook camp where Jamal al-Fadl trained in 1989, the organization was referred to as Al Qaeda.[3]
After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Saudi Arabia sought to support the jihad in Afghanistan with funds, as well as organizing humanitarian relief for the millions of Afghan refuges in Pakistan. Prince Salman and King Fahd were responsible for organizing assistance. In the early 1980s, they established fundraising committees in each region of Saudi Arabia, and the local emir asked prominent families to name a family member to serve on the committee. The Bin Laden family was asked and they chose Osama, as he was the most religious.[4]
At the time, Osama was working for the family construction company, and was working on the Mecca road extension project. After being appointed to the committee, Osama disappeared from the job and was gone a week or ten days. When he returned, Osama explained that he "flew to Pakistan on a Saudi Air Force C-130 with a load of blankets and canned food for the Afghans." Osama disappeared for a second time, and the third time, he said he was not coming back to work.[5]
In Pakistan, Bin Laden stayed in Islamabad with Abdullah Azzam, who had taught Bin Laden in university. Azzam had left Jeddah and was teaching at the Saudi-financed International Islamic University in Islamabad. Soon after arriving, Azzam began dividing his time between his teaching duties in Islamabad and Peshawar, the capital of the Northwest Frontier Province. He spent increasing amounts of time in Peshawar, "in order to be nearer the jihad." Azzam met regularly with ISI officials, including Zia ul-Haq. Azzam was respected by the Afghans, preaching about jihad as well as helping raise funds and recruit volunteers. Azzam was influential for persuading Muslims to join the fight (the jihad) in Afghanistan. Using violence was previously restricted to small radical groups like Egypt's Islamic Jihad or Gama'a al-Islamiyya.[6]
Initially, Bin Laden was only bringing funds to Pakistan for the Afghan mujahadeen. Bin Laden was also involved with fundraising, which he was successful at, since he could convince wealthy people to contribute to jihad, without concerns that he might "skim off" the proceeds. In Peshawar, Bin Laden also spent time visiting wounded mujahadeen, "handing out excellent English chocolates, taking down names and hometowns and making sure the families received both news and cash." Bin Laden and Azzam met regularly with Prince Turki al-Faisal (head of Saudi Intelligence) when he came to check on progress of the jihad.[7]
In 1982, Bin Laden stepped up his involvement by drawing on the expertise of his family's business in construction and engineering. Bin Laden was able to convince his family's company to bring construction equipment, as well as engineers, in order to help build roads, shelters, tunnels, underground bunkers, hospitals, and other infrastructure for the mujahadeen in Afghanistan.[8][9]
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Types of jihad:
- as defined by Abdullah Azzam |
In 1984, Bin Laden and Azzam established the Afghan Services Bureau (Maktab al-Khadamat or MAK), which organized Arab mujahideen in Afghanistan to resist the Soviets. The Afghan Services Bureau was a predecessor of Al Qaeda. The Afghan Services Bureau established offices in the Arab world, as well as Europe and the United States for the purpose of recruiting and fundraising.[10] The office in Peshawar accommodated Arab mujahadeen volunteers arriving in Pakistan, provided training, logistical support, along with financial support and other aid to the volunteer fighters and their families. A guest house, Beit al-Ansar, provided room and board for new volunteers.[11]
Azzam quit his teaching position in Islamabad in 1986, and came to Peshawar full-time. Azzam was successful in drawing funds for the Maktab al-Khadamat from the Muslim Brotherhood, with financial backing coming mainly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for salafi-minded madrasas, as well as military training camps in Pakistan.[12][13] Bin Laden continued fundraising efforts, receiving funds from wealthy Arabs in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Muslim world, as well as continuing to draw upon his personal funds.[14]
In 1986 Bin Laden expanded his involvement to include funding of training camps for both Afghan and Arab volunteers. The first camp built was in the Patkia Province, near Jaji. Bin Laden believed that the Afghans were not giving the Arab fighters enough opportunities for combat tasks, so the camps were to provide training to better prepare them for combat. At the same time, Afghans may have had some reluctance to fight with Arabs, since the Arab mujahadeen were perceived to be "crazy brave" and interested in martyrdom. In addition to military training, Bin Laden also included Islamic theology as part of the training.[15]
In May 1986, Osama himself traveled into Afghanistan where he and other Arab mujahadeen joined a group of Afghan mujahaddin in Jaji. While there, the Russian bombarded the area, with bombs in the distance, mines laid in the area, and a missile hit not so far away. The Afghans found the group of Arabs to be "useless" and asked them to leave. Toward the end of 1986, Osama established a separate camp, also in Jaji, for Arab mujahaddin. Azzam quarreled with Bin Laden over the idea of separating the Arab mujahaddin fighters from the Afghans.[16]
Since Osama was now interested in creating his own jihadist militia, he approached his brother Salem for help in obtaining weapons such as portable anti-aircraft missiles. His brother made an effort to contact the Pentagon for assistance, but was unable to find his way through the bureaucracy. He ended up instead going through the private arms market to obtain weapons, with his contacts able to obtain Russian-made SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles and ammunition for Chinese-made AK-47 rifles from a source in South America, as well as some weapons from South African arms dealers. Some of the money for the purchase possibly came from the Saudi government for purchase of the weapons.[17]
In 1987, Bin Laden was spending time other Arab volunteers near Jaji in Afghanistan where, in April/May 1987, they withstood an onslaught from the Soviets for more than ten days. The Lion's Den Operation (Battle of Jaji), in the Afghan province of Paktia, was a important battle. The mujahaddin were well-equipped with Stinger missiles, which they used to shoot down Soviet helicopters. After a week, the Soviets retreated and the mujahaddin victory was widely reported in the Arab press. In an interview with CNN journalist Peter Arnett, Osama said he was exposed to poison gas attacks and suffered minor injuries during the 1987 operation.[18] The extent of Osama's involvement is most likely exaggerated, as the earliest known descriptions of the battle in Azzam's Al-Jihad publication do not mention Bin Laden's role in the battles. But, Osama saw this as an opportunity for story-telling, and he began telling of his experiences in the battle to journalists.[19]
Towards the end of the 1980s, additional key battles took place with mujahideen involvement, leading to the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989. As the Soviets were going down in defeat, bin Laden and Azzam had discussions about the future of MAK and what to do with the mujahidin force that had built up. Osama and Azzam both wanted to use the force as a "rapid reaction force" to defend oppressed Muslims around the world. After the defeat of the Soviets, members of the mujahideen went home and desired social and political against the corrupt, dictatorial regimes in the Middle East. Bin Laden wanted to train the Egyptian mujahideen in terrorist tactics, which they could use back home. Azzam strongly disagreed with this approach, issuing a fatwa saying that it would violate Islamic law. Azzam reiterated the hadith that orders Muslims not to kill any women or children.[20]
In August 1988, Osama bin Laden organized meetings in Peshawar about the future, having already invested in the young mujaheddin. Bin Laden had gained a lot from marketing the jihad, with strong support from people in Saudi Arabia. At a second meeting, proposed a new approach, taking into account missteps in Azzam's organization. Osama wanted to train a "separatist Arab militia," using weapons he had acquired and he would set up camps which he would call القاعدة العسكرية ("al qaeda al-askariya" or the military base). In Al Qaeda, Osama emphasized diversity and inclusion, provided finances and his management skills, and he was interested in "technologies of global integration." These aspects of Al Qaeda distinguished it from other militant Islamist groups.[21] In encouraging diversity and inclusion, the number of Arab mujahaddin coming to Afghanistan increased sharply beginning in 1987. The new recruits were of a different type than those who came before, recruited by Azzam.[22]
| “ | They were “men with large amounts of money and boiling emotions,” an al-Qaeda diarist noted. Pampered kids from the Persian Gulf came on excursions, staying in air-conditioned cargo containers; they were supplied with RPGs and Kalashnikovs, which they could fire into the air, and then they could return home, boasting`of their adventure. Many of them were newly religious high school or university students with no history and no one to vouch for them. Chaos and barbarism, which always threatened to overwhelm the movement, sharply increased as bin Laden took the helm. -- Wright, Lawrence - The Looming Tower | ” |
In 1988-89, Bin Laden talked about the purpose of the new organization being created out of the Maktab al-Khidamat with Jamal al-Fadl and others. Bin Laden wanted to take the jihad to the next step and restore the Caliphate. Bin Laden explained that "he wanted to change the Arab government (possibly specifically referring to Saudi Arabia) because there's no Muslim government."[3] Speaking to the organization's Shura Council in Peshawar, Bin Laden explained his idea of setting up "an army of young men" to respond to the "jihad call." Bin Laden "did not speak of the jihad against Arab regimes, but of helping Muslims against the infidel government oppressing them, as was the case in Palestine, the Philippines, and Kashmir, especially Central Asia, which was under Soviet rule them."[23]
Al Qaeda, the name and some part of the organization, may have originated with a program established to keep track of Arab mujahadeen fighters. Towards the end of the fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets, Bin Laden realized he needed to keep track of the Arab mujahadeen coming in and those who had gone missing. Bin Laden then established recordkeeping, which was ran out the guest house in Peshawar. The guest house and the camps then became known as Al Qaeda ("the base").[24]
In 1989, Bin Laden split from his former mentor, Abdullah Azzam, taking a more radical path where he advocated jihad against governments across the Muslim world.[25] On November 24, 1989, soon after bin Laden and Azzam split, Azzam was killed in Peshawar, Pakistan. Azzam and his two sons were travelling to Jummah (Friday prayer) when a remote-control activated bomb detonated and killed them. It is not known for certain if Osama was behind this, but thought unlikely or could have been a related group. At this time, Osama was free to take full control of MAK, laying groundwork for Al Qaeda.[26] Umar Abd al-Rahman (the "Blind Sheihk"), who was spiritual leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group, succeeded Azzam as leader of the "international jihadists" and spiritual leader of Al Qaeda.[27]
At this point, Bin Laden did not have firm plans for going forward. Ahmed Badeeb, a former high school teacher, friend, and leader in Saudi intelligence, urged Bin Laden to come back to Saudi Arabia. Badeeb wanted to thin out the Saudi presence in Pakistan. This also was an important time, after the death of Salem Bin Laden, when the family businesses were being reorganized. It was important for Bin Laden to be present at that time.[21]
After the Blind Sheikh was arrested following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Dr. Ayman Muhammad Rabi' al-Zawahiri became a key influence for Osama, and steered him in a more radical direction.[27] Progress against the Arab regimes was slow, so Al Qaeda decided to also give attention to the United States and its allies as targets. Bin Laden believed that the United States, Israel and western allies stood in the way of regime change in the Middle East.[28]
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda came on the U.S. radar in the mid-1990s, and the term "Al Qaeda" was first publicly used in 1996 in a State Department fact sheet.[29] Also in 1996, the Central Intelligence Agency established a special task force for dealing with Osama bin Laden, and the FBI began its criminal investigation into Osama bin Laden. In 1998, the United States issued an indictment against Osama bin Laden.
In January-February 2001, four members of Al Qaeda went on trial for the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The defendants included Wadih El-Hage, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-'Owhali, Mohammed Saddiq Odeh and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed. The trial included testimony from Al Qaeda defectors, L'Houssaine Kherchtou and Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl.[30] Ali A. Mohamed also provided important information during the trial.[31]
Plots:
Al Qaeda adheres to an ideology of radical Islamism, a form of religious totalitarianism, which views the world as one where "faith must reign supreme and can be affirmed and held passionately only if all others are negated."[43] In many Islamic madrasas, children are taught this fundamentalist religious ideology. In contrast, the United States and many other western countries reflect an ideology of pluralism, which embraces religious diversity and tolerates secularism and other religions.
In its desire to oust regimes in the Middle East, Al Qaeda's position is that "Islamic governments have never been and never will be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been, by pen and gun by word and bullet by tongue and teeth."[44][45]
Al Qaeda has worked as a shadowy group, using various other names, and maintains tight controls on who an join the inner circles.[46] Al Qaeda followed several key protocols, including never to claim responsibility for its acts.[47] Another hallmark of Al Qaeda are the lengthy, elaborate preparations for attacks, as well as extensive training for recruits. Between 1989 and October 2001, an estimated 70,000 - 110,000 recruits were trained by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.[48][49] With the belief they are fighting what's part of a long struggle of defending Islam, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda exercise a great deal of patience.[50]
Unlike suicide bombers in the Palestinian intifada who often come from impoverished backgrounds, the 9/11 hijackers and many other Al Qaeda members are well-educated and come from more privileged backgrounds. Few of the terrorists involved in 9/11 and other major plots (e.g. 2005 London bombings, 2002 Bali nightclub bombings, 1998 African embassy bombings, 1993 World Trade Center bombing) had attended religious madressas, but a large portion of them attended university. More than half studied science or technical subjects, with engineering and medicine being the most popular subjects. As well, 27 percent of these terrorists had studied abroad, in western countries, where they may have felt alienated.[51] When they came to the U.S., the hijackers easily blended into the society, shaving their beards, working out at gyms, and some drinking alcohol.[52]
Bin Laden has managed al-Qaeda in a very businesslike manner, influenced by how his father operated the Saudi Bin Laden Group. Al Qaeda has a shura counsel that advises Bin Laden and is involved in formulating general policies for the organization. In addition to the shura council, Al Qaeda also has various subcommittees for managing military affairs, money and business, and media affairs. There also is a committee for fatwas and Islamic study.[53][3]
Though operating from remote parts of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda makes use of modern techniques and technology.[52] Back in 1996, when Bin Laden issued his first fatwa, he used a computer (Apple Macintosh) to prepare the message, had it e-mailed or faxed to others in Pakistan and the U.K., who got it to the news media who spread it widely across the Middle East and elsewhere.[54]
In December 2001, Wall Street Journal reporter Alan Cullison bought a computer from a looter, which had been used mainly by Ayman al-Zawahiri, but also by Bin Laden and other senior Al Qaeda members. The looter took the desktop computer, along with a laptop, from an Al-Qaeda office following a November 2001 bombing raid that killed several Al Qaeda members.[55] The computer's hard drive contained numerous files that reveal the inner workings of Al Qaeda. Memos on the computer referred to Al Qaeda as "the company" and its leadership as "the management".[56] The computer also contained files relating to Al Qaeda's chemical and biological weapons programs, as well as a propaganda video celebrating the attacks which featured 9/11 footage.[57] As well, there was a letter with details on the death of anti-Taliban leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud, on September 9, 2001, who was conned into an interview with a "journalist" and killed when a bomb detonated.[58] The computer also contained details on the planning of the 9/11 attacks, a process that Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, Mohammed Atef, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were all deeply involved with.[59]
Al Qaeda was not funded out of Bin Laden's personal fortune, but rather from funds raised through charities, as well as "legitimate" business activities. While Bin Laden was based in Sudan in the early and mid-1990s, the organization operated numerous legitimate businesses and paid salaries to Al Qaeda members.
At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Indian intelligence officials estimated there were over 120 Al Qaeda training camps operating in Afghanistan, as well as some camps in Pakistan that may have been operated by Al-Badr, a possibly related group.[60]
According to a CIA report, by early 2001, Al Qaeda had trained as many as 5,000 militants, who in turn had created cells in 50 countries.[61]
At the al-Badr camp in Afghanistan during the 1990s, recruits were trained in use of high-tech explosives.[52]
Hamza al-Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, and other "muscle" hijackers are known to have trained at the al-Farouq camp in Afghanistan.[62] There, Mohammed Zein Abu Zubaydah selected the participants for the 9/11 attacks.
Ten to twenty thousand men came to Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, between 1996 and 2001. Those that came tended to be young, unmarried, Sunni and included men from Algeria as well as Europe.
When they arrived, Al Qaeda interviewed them about their skills and background so that Al Qaeda could determine assignments for the recruits.
Recruits endured strenuous physical training, and they were "indoctrinated with the al-Qaeda worldview."
Death was the main attraction for many of the recruits.
At the camps, recruits learned about both successful and unsuccessful past operations. They studied from a 180-page manual, Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants which included material on counterfeiting, weapons training, security, and espionage.
There were three main stages of training for recruits:
New recruits spent fifteen days in boot camp, where they "were pushed to exhaustion, with only a couple hours of sleep some nights."
The second stage lasted forty-five days. Recruits received basic military training in "map reading, trenching, celestial navitagion, and the use of an extraordinary variety of weapons, including light machine guns, Claymore mines, mortars, shoulder-fired rockets, and anti-aircraft missles." The "targets" in the exercises were "enemies of Islam", mainly Americans (soldiers or vehicles), but they also considered Israel, Heretics ("Mubaraks of the world"), and Shiites as enemies.
In the third stage, recruits had the option of attending guerrilla warfare school (45-days). There were also specialty camps in hijacking and espionage, and a ten-day course in assassination. Another camp specialized in making bombs, and another called the "Kamikaze Camp" was reserved for suicide bombers who wore special white or gray clothes and lived alone, speaking to no one.
There was a well-supplied library of military books, as well as movies.
Zawahiri was particularly keen on the use of biological and chemical warfare. He established a program, code-named "Zabadi" -- "curdled milk" -- to explore the use of unconventional techniques for mass murder. He pored over medical journals to research various poisons. He noted, "Despite their extreme danger, we only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concern that they can be produced simply." One of his men, Abu Khabab, set up a laboratory near Jalalabad where he experimented on dogs with homemade nerve gas and videotaped their agonizing deaths. Zawahiri set up another laboratory near Kandahar where Malaysian businessman Yzid Sufaat worked on cultivating biological weapons, particularly anthrax.
Bin Laden was cool at first to the use of biological or chemical weapons, but he found himself at odds with Abu Hafs, who led the hawks in the al-Qaeda debate about the ethics and consequences of using such indiscriminating agents. The doves also argued that the use of any weapon of mass destruction would turn the sympathy of the world against the Muslim cause and provoke a massive American response against Afghanistan.
On the other hand, the "hawks" pointed out that Americans had already used nuclear bombs twice. "If the United States decided to use nuclear weapons again, who would protect the Muslims? The UN? The Arab rulers? It was up to al-Qaeda to create a weapon that would inoculate the Muslim world against Western imperialism."
Indicting Bin Laden and prosecuting him for his role in the 9/11 attacks, through the usual criminal justice process in the U.S. is not the only and possibly not the best option.
The terrorist crimes of September 11 violate a host of U.S. criminal laws, including laws that criminalize acts of international terrorism (specifically when such acts include homicide); destruction of aircraft, incapacitating any individual on an aircraft, performing an act of violence against any individual on an aircraft, or conspiring to do so; and forgery of passports or other immigration documents. The terrorist crimes also probably constitute crimes against humanity, namely, multiple acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack knowingly directed against any civilian population in furtherance of a state or organizational policy. The latter would be a novel charge to prosecute in a U.S. federal court, as it derives from customary international law and is not codified as such in the U.S. federal criminal code. But as a matter of international law, the attacks of September 11 could be characterized as crimes against humanity and could be charged against the perpetrators, if not in U.S. federal court then in a foreign jurisdiction or international tribunal that exercises personal jurisdiction over one or more suspects or recognizes such crimes as crimes of universal jurisdiction.[63]
Prosecution in foreign national courts may prove to be the more likely alternative to U.S. prosecution in a number of cases. British prosecution of the Lockerbie (Pan Am 103) defendants (albeit in a special courtroom established in The Netherlands and adjudicated under Scottish law by Scottish judges) proved in the long run to be a much more attractive option than U.S. prosecution for that particular terrorist crime. Foreign prosecutions may also have important political advantages. In terms of constructing a robust international legal architecture for dealing with terrorism, the optics and the practical consequences of having prosecutions in both U.S. and foreign courts is significant. This may prove crucial to the long-term campaign, and American victims should take comfort from a scenario in which the United States does not have to go it alone; rather a variety of countries, through rigorous prosecutions, would treat the September 11 attacks and their fallout as attacks against all civilized nations. Foreign trials may also prove essential in dealing with persons in the al Qaeda network who cannot be prosecuted for U.S. crimes but are still important parts of the overall terrorist threat to us.
Terrorist suspects may be investigated and prosecuted in one or more foreign courts regardless of U.S. interests or desires, and this is already happening. A foreign government may refuse a U.S. extradition request, for example. This could well be the case if the United States declines to waive the death penalty with respect to a terrorist suspect held in an anti-death penalty jurisdiction. Also, foreign officials may consider it their own responsibility to bring to justice individuals who engaged within their jurisdiction in the planning or commission of terrorist attacks either on their own soil or elsewhere. And the United States may find it preferable for certain low- or mid-level terrorist suspects to be prosecuted before foreign courts, particularly in highly developed jurisdictions where we have confidence in the judicial system.
In 2003, Investigative magistrate Baltasar Garzon of Spain issued an indictment against Osama bin Laden for his involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Along with bin Laden, Ramzi Binalshibh and others affiliated with Al Qaeda were also indicted.[64] The indictment included evidence that Spain was used as a staging ground for the attacks.[65] Spain does not allow trials for suspects in absentia.[65]
Spain also put a number of other suspects on trial for their role in the 9/11 attacks. In September 2005, Imad Yarkas was sentenced to 27 years in prison on charges of criminal conspiracy and involvement in the 9/11 plot. Yarkas was involved in coordinating a July 2001 meeting in Spain between Mohamed Atta and Ramzi Binalshibh.[66] Others charged in Spain included Ghasoub al-Abrash Ghalyoun, accused of filming landmarks in New York City in 1997, Driss Chebli for assisting Al Qaeda members involved in 9/11, and 21 other defendants for being associated or members of a terrorist group and other changes.[67]