In August 2005, congressman Curt Weldon said that prior to 9/11, a highly classified military intelligence unit (known as Able Danger) had identified Mohamed Atta and three other hijackers (Marwan al-Shehhi, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Khalid al-Mihdhar) as Al Qaeda members that were part of a "Brooklyn cell".
The Able Danger program was established in 1999, under a classified directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ceased operation in January 2001.[1] Able Danger was a data mining program to gather information about Al Qaeda.[2] The program used link analysis to map connections "among terrorist suspects and produced diagrams of terrorist networks."[3] During the first few months of 2000 or as late as the summer of 2000, the unit had prepared a chart, with 60 probable members of Al Qaeda, reportedly including visa photographs of the four hijackers.[4][5] Information on the cart was drawn from unclassified sources and government records, such as the INS. The chart was sent to Special Operations Command headquarters in Tampa. They recommended to the Special Operations Command that this information be shared with the FBI.[2]
This is the account given by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who met with 9/11 Commission members in 2003. Shaffer mentioned spoke to the media in August 2005 about Able Danger, and added that "many of his allegations are not based on his memory but on the recollections of others," namely Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott as well as a civilian employee of the former Land Information Warfare Activity at Fort Belvoir.[6]
| “ | I did see the charts and I did handle the charts, but my understanding of them was like a layman," Shaffer said. "We had identified them as terrorists. . . . But even now I do not remember all the names.[6] | ” |
Before 9/11, there was some reluctance to share information between the military/intelligence and domestic law enforcement, including the FBI. United States citizens and green-card holders are by law, not to be singled out by intelligence operations. The reluctance to share may have extended to people in the United States with valid entry visas, including Atta and the others.[2] Information was also not shared with the CIA or other civilian intelligence agencies.[7]
Shaffer, who spoke with the media in August 2005 about Able Danger, said that:
| “ | The small, highly classified intelligence program, known as Able Danger, had identified the terrorist ringleader, Mohamed Atta, and three other future hijackers by name by mid-2000, and tried to arrange a meeting that summer with agents of the Washington field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to share its information. But he said military lawyers forced members of the intelligence program to cancel three scheduled meetings with the F.B.I. at the last minute.[8] | ” |
Shaffer also said that:
| “ | Lawyers associated with the Special Operations Command of the Defense Department had canceled the F.B.I. meetings because they feared controversy if Able Danger was portrayed as a military operation that had violated the privacy of civilians who were legally in the United States.[8] | ” |
Others involved with Able Danger denied that "efforts to meet with FBI antiterrorism units were made, much less thwarted by DoD officials."[9]
The charts were produced for training purposes to show link analysis of known al-Qaeda members. The chart was provided to Able Danger in January 2000. It showed a "Brooklyn cell" with individuals identified as terrorists, with involvement or connections to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing or the New York City "Landmarks" plot. One of the individuals "arguably" resembled Atta, but was not Atta. Some of the names may have also sounded like Atta (e.g. Mohammed Atef, a Bin Laden deputy), and Mohammed is a very common Arab name. These are possible reasons why some may have been mistaken about what they saw on the chart.[10]
The Senate Intelligence Committee found that "the employee who created the charts with the photographs of al-Qaeda associates was emphatic that no charts produced by the defense contractor [Orion] included the name or photograph of Mohamed Atta, or any of the other 9/11 hijackers, prior to the 9/11 attacks." Similar charts were produced after 9/11 by the same employee, which did include information about Mohamed Atta and the other hijackers.[10]
Weldon told the New York Times that "he was basing his assertions on similar ones by at least three other former intelligence officers with direct knowledge of the project, and said that some had first called the episode to his attention shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001."[2] He spoke with the three Able Danger team members while working on his book, Countdown to Terror.[7] Weldon first mentioned Able Danger in June 2005, in a speech on the House floor and in an interview with The Times-Herald in Norristown, Pennsylvania. It resurfaced in August in a report by the Government Security News, and was picked up by the New York Times.[2]
In his book, Weldon also claims that he "handed then Deputy National Security Adviser Steven Hadley a 1999 Pentagon chart pegging Atta as a member of al-Qaeda."[11] A Pentagon contractor who worked on Able Danger still had a chart. Shaffer recalls talking with the contractor after 9/11, "We had coffee and talked about this issue," Shaffer said. "She's the one who brought it to my attention: `Oh, by the way, here's one of the charts from before 9/11.' It was one of those open-source data runs, and it showed the picture." Within days of his conversation with the contractor, someone associated with Able Danger brought the chart to Weldon, whose House subcommittee on military technology had funded Able Danger.[12] This contractor told the Senate Intelligence Committee that she was not the source of any pre-9/11 charts. She said that she did take a chart to Weldon, but it was created after 9/11. That chart did depict Atta and a number of the other hijackers.[10]
On September 23, 2005, Stephen Hadley denied receiving a chart that identified Mohamed Atta. A National Security Council spokesperson said that "Hadley did recall seeing a chart used as an example of "link analysis" -- the technique used by the Able Danger program as a counterterrorism tool -- but is not sure whether it happened during a Sept. 25, 2001, meeting with Weldon or at another session."[13] Weldon had in his office a replica of an organizational diagram of Al Qaeda.[14]
In March 2006, Weldon began to back track on his claim, saying now "he's not sure the chart had a picture of Atta, as he has sometimes maintained, and that he has been relying on the memory of an intelligence analyst who helped produce it."[15]
Philip Zelikow and other members of the 9/11 Commission were told about Able Danger in October 2003, during an overseas trip.[2] But, they were not informed that Able Danger had identified Atta and the others before 9/11.[7] T
The 9/11 Commission was told again about Able Danger, 10 days before its final report was released, when senior investigator Dieter Snell and another staff member met with a Navy officer. The officer said "that he recalled seeing Atta's name and photograph on a chart prepared by another officer"[3] and suggested that the program had identified Atta during the summer of 2000.[16]
The Commission said that "the information had not been included in the report because aspects of the officer's account had sounded inconsistent with what the commission knew about Atta." The Navy officer that briefed the 9/11 Commission in July 2004 told them, "that Able Danger had identified Mr. Atta, an Egyptian, as having been in the United States in late 1999 or early 2000," and had placed him in Brooklyn.[16]
Some reasons why the Able Danger claim did not add up:
Investigators and counterterrorism experts suggested that the claims may have been based on false recollections of those involved.[13]
On September 1, 2005, the Pentagon said it found three more people that recalled seeing Atta's name or picture on an intelligence briefing slide. However, investigators at the Pentagon also had reviewed thousands of documents and electronic files from the Able Danger counterterrorism unit, but did not find the chart or evidence that the chart had existed.[17]
In mid-September, former Army major, Erik Kleinsmith testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee. He said in prepared testimony that "he was forced to destroy all the data, charts and other analytical materials he had in mid-2000."[18] Data harvesting will collect a great deal of information about people, not just Al Qaeda members but a lot of Americans. The military is not supposed to collect information about Americans, so the data was then purged.[19] This purging of data followed standard procedures, for handing this type of information.[9]
Pentagon investigators did find two other diagrams: "One from 1999 included the name and photograph of Mohammed Atef -- not Atta -- a well-known al Qaeda lieutenant. Another included the photo of a convicted terrorist named Eyad Ismoil, an Egyptian who bears a resemblance to Atta -- and who, unlike Atta, was part of the Brooklyn cell tied to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing."[13]
Philpott later recanted his recollection, telling investigators that he was "convinced that Atta was not on the chart that we had." He said he believes others, including Shaffer, were "relying on my recollection 100 percent." The Inspector General's report suggested that Philpott "may have exaggerated knowing Atta's identity because he supported using Able Danger's techniques to fight terrorism."[20]
The Senate Intelligence Committee also looked into the claim that Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta before 9/11, with a 16-month investigation. The committee concluded that those assertions are unfounded.[21]
John Lehman, a former commission member who was Navy secretary in the Reagan administration, said:
| “ | To believe the conspiracy theory that people are pushing on Able Danger, you have to believe that all of us, conservative Republicans and Democrats on the 9/11 commission, are in league with the Defense Department and the secretary of defense and the National Security Agency in a vast right- and left-wing conspiracy to cover this up. It is absurd to think that within our vast bureaucratic system, the conspirators were able to make disappear every piece of paper that ever existed on this.[15] | ” |